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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Daisha Maloney contends that the search of her purse in this case was not justified by the
automobile exception because her purse was not a container in the car when probable cause to
search the car was developed, as discussed in an unpublished opinion from the Idaho Court of
Appeals.

She explained this Court should formally adopt the Court of Appeals' analysis to

answer this open question in Idaho because it was consistent with the relevant Idaho precedent
and overall Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. She also noted that most other jurisdictions to
directly address the question have adopted that same analysis and or reinforce that it is the
appropriate analysis to use.
The State did not discuss the Idaho precedent or the Court of Appeals' unpublished
decision at all in its analysis of this case. That failure is troubling because the district court's
rationale, which the State advocated as the "common sense" analysis, actually runs counter to the
relevant Idaho and overall Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Moreover, the only case the State
cites in support of its position (from Iowa) does not actually support its argument. In fact, the
Iowa Court of Appeals has, in an unpublished decision, actually explained how the very
argument the State made in that regard is erroneous. While the State acknowledged the Iowa
Court of Appeals' unpublished opinion, it misrepresented the nature of its analysis on this issue.
For all these reasons, this Court should reject the State's argument and formally answer
this question of first impression by adopting the well-reasoned analysis reflected in the Idaho
Court of Appeal's unpublished opinion. As such, it should reverse the district court's decision
denying Ms. Maloney' s motion to suppress.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Ms. Maloney' s Appellant's Brief

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

2

ISSUE
Whether the search of Ms. Maloney's purse was not lawful under the automobile exception
because her purse was not in the car when the officer developed probable cause to search the car.

3

ARGUMENT
The Search Of Ms. Maloney's Purse Was Not Lawful Under The Automobile Exception Because
Her Purse Was Not In The Car When The Officer Developed Probable Cause To Search The Car

A.

The State's Argument Is Inconsistent With The Relevant Idaho Precedents And Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence
Ms. Maloney detailed how the relevant Idaho precedent demonstrates that the Court of

Appeals' unpublished opinion in State v. Holt, 2017 WL 3574623 (Ct. App. 2017), 1 was well
reasoned and its analysis as to why a container that was not in the car when probable cause to
search the car developed cannot be searched pursuant to the automobile exception should be
formally adopted. (App. Br., pp.5-9.) The State did not mention Holt at all and it did not contest
Ms. Maloney's analysis of how the other Idaho cases support the analysis in Holt. (See generally
Resp. Br.)

Rather, it simply asserts that the district court's contrary view represents the

"common sense reasoning" on this issue. (Resp. Br., p.8.) This Court should reject the State's
unsupported assertion in that regard because the relevant Idaho precedent reveals that the district
court's reasoning is actually contrary to the applicable Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and
therefore, actually not the common-sense approach.
As both the Idaho Court of Appeals and United States Supreme Court have made clear,
the automobile only applies when "probable cause exists to believe a vehicle contains evidence

1

As in her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Maloney continues to recognize that unpublished decisions do
not constitute precedent, and she does not cite Holt as authority requiring a particular decision in
this case. Rather, she merely references it as a historical example of how a learned court has
analyzed the question at issue here and urges this Court to adopt that well-reasoned analysis.
Compare Staff of Idaho Real Estate Comm 'n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 634 (2001) (quoting
Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119 Idaho 611, 617 (1991)) ("When this Court had cause to consider
unpublished opinions from other jurisdictions because an appellant had discussed the cases in his
petition, we found the presentation of the unpublished opinions as 'quite appropriat[ e].'
Likewise, we find the hearing officer's consideration of the unpublished opinion, not as binding
precedent but as an example, was appropriate.").
4

of criminal activity," and so, only authorizes "the search of any area of the vehicle in which the
evidence might be found." State v. Newman, 149 Idaho 596, 600 (Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis
added); accord Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999) (explaining "the Framers would
have regarded as reasonable (if there was probable cause) the warrantless search of containers
within an automobile") (emphasis from original). Thus, common sense says that, when a purse is

no longer within the vehicle when probable cause to search the vehicle develops, the purse is not
an area of the vehicle in which the suspected evidence might be found, and therefore, not subject
to the auto mo bile exception.
In other words, the problem with the State's argument is that it "places too much
emphasis on probable cause" in a vacuum rather than actually analyzing it within the context of
the particular exception to the warrant requirement at issue. See State v. Blythe,_ Idaho_,
462 P.3d 1177, 1182 (2020) (rejecting a similar argument under the search-incident-to-arrest
exception to the warrant requirement). Probable cause "does not, by itself, justify a search"
without a warrant. Id. While probable cause is certainly a necessary prerequisite for such a
search, it only authorizes a warrantless search if it exists alongside a justification for not getting a
warrant. See id. Therefore, even when probable cause exists, the search must still serve the
historical rationales for not requiring the officer to seek a warrant upon which the particular
exception is based. Id. at 1182-83.
There are two historical rationales for not requiring an officer to get a warrant to search a
car when he has probable cause to believe there is contraband in the car: the extraordinary
mobility of cars and the diminished expectation of privacy that exists in cars. State v. Bottleson,
102 Idaho 90, 92 (1981). However, "the automobile exception does not generally extend to the
warrantless search of luggage within an automobile." Id. In other words, those two historical
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rationales do not automatically justify the search of containers just because "probable cause," as
a nebulous concept, develops during the stop. Compare Blythe, 462 P.3d at 1182.
Rather, as noted in the Appellant's Brief, the probable cause analysis is limited to the
specific facts of the situation at issue. Thus, probable cause to search the trunk of a car does not
justify a search of the passenger compartment or containers in the passenger compartment under
the automobile exception. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991). The reverse is also
true -the officers cannot search a container in the trunk of a car if they only have probable cause
to believe contraband will be found in the passenger compartment. State v. Schmadeka, 136
Idaho 595, 600 (Ct. App. 2001). This jurisprudence also reveals that the mobility rationale does
not automatically justifies the search of all containers in the car at the time of the stop. The State
offered no analysis about this jurisprudence, and as such, the State's contrary position cannot
represent the "common sense" rationale under the Fourth Amendment. (See generally Resp. Br.)
The State's argument gains no more traction with respect to other historical rationale for
the automobile exception. As noted in the Appellant's Brief, the Idaho Court of Appeals has
expressly and unambiguously held that the diminished expectation of privacy that a person has in
an automobile "does not mean that an officer can search a bag without probable cause." State v.
Lovely, 159 Idaho 675, 678 (Ct. App. 2016). The automobile exception simply allows that

probable cause to search the car will extend to containers that are within the car, since those
containers are, at the moment probable cause develops, still subject to the diminished expectation
of privacy. See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300. Again, the State offered no analysis about this
jurisprudence. (See generally Resp. Br.) Since Ms. Maloney's purse was no longer in the car
when the probable cause to search the car developed, it was not subject to the diminished
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expectation of privacy that attaches to car at that time. As such, the search of her purse did not
serve that historical rationale either.
All this demonstrates the common-sense understanding in the Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence that the focus of the automobile exception is whether the authorization to search
the automobile extends to a container in the automobile - whether the container is a place where

the contraband might be found in the automobile. If the container is in the car when the officer
develops probable cause to search the car, the container can be searched as part of the car. But if
the container is not in the car when the officer develops probable cause, it cannot be searched
because it is not a part of the car where contraband is suspected.
Simply put, "[t]he fact that the container was within an automobile controls" the analysis
under the automobile exception. State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 898 (1991). Or, as the United
States Supreme Court explained: "The critical element in a reasonable search is not that the
owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe that the
specific 'things' to be searched for and seized are located on the property to which entry is
sought." Houghton, 526 U.S. at 302 (internal quotation omitted). The property to be searched
under the automobile exception is the automobile itself See id. As such, "[w ]hen there is
probable cause to search for contraband in a car, it is reasonable for police officers ... to
examine packages and containers without a showing of individualized probable cause for each
one" because they are "'in' the car, and the officer has probable cause to search for contraband in
the car."

Houghton, 526 U.S. at 302 (emphasis from original).

Thus, the common-sense

analysis under the applicable Fourth Amendment jurisprudence says that, when a purse is no
longer in the car when probable cause to suspect contraband is in the car, that means the purse is
no longer a place where contraband might be found in the car. See id. As a result, the actual
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common-sense analysis, per the applicable Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, demonstrates that
a purse removed from the car before probable cause develops is beyond the scope of the
auto mo bile exception.
In fact, this precise common-sense analysis is reflected in the Court of Appeals'
unpublished decision in Holt, which provides a historical example of how a learned court in
Idaho has actually already assessed this very question. Holt, 2017 WL 3574623. And yet, the
State argues that common sense runs to the contrary without so much as acknowledging this
recent historical example or discussing the relevant Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that
supports it. (See generally Resp. Br.) Therefore, this Court should adopt the Court of Appeals'
well-reasoned rule from Holt in formally answering this question of first impression in Idaho,
since it reflects the actual common-sense analysis which consistent with the applicable Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.

B.

When Fully Read, The Iowa Case Which The State Cited Does Not Actually Support The
State's Argument; In Fact, The Iowa Court Of Appeals Has, In An Unpublished Opinion,
Explained The State's Argument Is Wrong On Its Face
Other jurisdictions which have actually addressed this issue have adopted the same

reasoning the Court of Appeals used in Holt, and the analysis used by still other jurisdictions
reinforce the conclusion that it is the appropriate, common-sense analysis under the Fourth
Amendment. (See App. Br., pp.6-9 (discussing the other cases in detail).) In a footnote, the
State asserts, without any analysis, that several of the decisions from other jurisdictions simply
recognize probable cause as part of the formulation of the automobile exception. (Resp. Br., p.6
n.1.) However, just as the State did not contradict Ms. Maloney's analysis of how the Idaho
precedent supports the Holt reasoning, it did not actually contradict her analysis of how those
other states' applications of the automobile exception reinforce Holt's reasoning. (See generally
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Resp. Br.) As such, for the same reasons discussed in Section A, supra, all these opinions from
sister jurisdictions further reveal why the Court of Appeals' analysis in Holt represents the
common-sense approach under the Fourth Amendment.
The only case which the State actually cited in support of its counterargument from any
jurisdiction was State v. Eubanks, 355 N.W.2d 57, 60 (Iowa 1984).

(See generally Resp.

Br., pp.6-9.) However, a full reading of Eubanks reveals it actually supports Ms. Maloney's
argument, not the State's.
In Eubanks, probable cause developed before the container was removed from the car:
"As the officer approached the car, he detected an odor of marijuana emanating from the
interior." Id. at 58. As a result, the officer could, indeed, search all containers that were in the
car "when it was stopped," because they were, in the totality of those circumstances, all
containers representing areas in the car in which the suspected contraband might be found. Id.
However, the Iowa Supreme Court also pointed out the search in that case was appropriate was
because the officer "could lawfully open and examine all containers within the vehicle from the
time probable cause appeared." Id. at 60 (emphasis added); compare Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300

(explaining "the Framers would have regarded as reasonable (if there was probable cause) the
warrantless search of containers within an automobile") (emphasis altered). As such, the Iowa
Supreme Court's analysis actually tracks with the common-sense perspective adopted by most
other jurisdictions and which is reflected in Idaho's precedent. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 152
Idaho 115, 120-21 (Ct. App. 2011) (where an officer developed probable cause that the car
contained contraband as he approached the car, he could search all containers in the car at that
time, regardless of whether one was subsequently removed from the car).

9

The Iowa Court of Appeals has, in fact, actually reached this same conclusion and, in the
process, explained that the very way the State is now trying to use Eubanks is improper. State v.
Campbell, 908 N.W.2d 539, *1 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017) (emphasis from original),
unpublished. 2 The State mentions Campbell in a footnote, asserting that it merely includes

probable cause as a part of the analysis. (Resp. Br., p.6 n.1.) That drastically misrepresents the
analysis conducted in Campbell because Campbell went on to endorse the very argument
Ms. Maloney is making.
In Campbell, the prosecutor had argued in the trial court that the search of the purse
should be upheld based on the language in Eubanks which talked about searching all the
containers in the car when it was stopped. Campbell, 908 N.W.2d 539 (Table), at * 1. Although
the prosecutor abandoned that argument on appeal, the Campbell Court nevertheless proceeded
to explain why that argument was flawed. Id. at *1 n.2.
Specifically, the Campbell Court explained, "the automobile exception permits all
containers inside a vehicle to be searched at the time when probable cause to search arises, not
all containers located in the vehicle at the time the vehicle is stopped. See State v. Eubanks . ... "
Id. (emphasis from original). It noted that Eubanks was the product of the specific facts in that

case, since, "[ o ]ften the lawful stop of the vehicle and the probable cause to search will occur
contemporaneously, as in Eubanks, where the officer smelled marijuana as the officer
approached the car."3 Id. (citing Eubanks, 355 N.W.2d at 58). It was this specific fact - that the

2

As with Holt, Campbell is cited, not as controlling precedent, but merely as a historical
example of how yet another learned court has analyzed the question at issue here. See Nordling,
135 Idaho at 634; Bourgeois, 119 Idaho at 617.
3
Campbell's acknowledgement that probable cause will "often" arise before containers can be
removed from the car reinforces Ms. Maloney' s point that the district court's concern about
occupants trying to thwart searches by removing containers from the car is unfounded. (App.
Br., p.12.) Rather, most cases will be resolved like Smith, 152 Idaho at 120-21 -where probable

officer in Eubanks had probable cause before the purse was removed from the car - which,
allowed for that purse to be searched under the automobile exception in Eubanks:
Eubanks's removal of her purse after the officer asked her to step out of the
vehicle did not insulate the purse from the automobile exception search because
the purse was in the vehicle at the time the officer smelled the marijuana. Id. at
60 ("Once the patrolman lawfully stopped the car and had probable cause to
search for contraband, all containers within the car when it was stopped were fair
game for the car search. Defendant had no right to insulate her purse or any other
container from a lawful warrantless search by the simple expedient of physically
removing the purse and its contents from the car while the search was in
progress." (emphasis added))
Campbell, 908 N.W.2d 539 (Table), at *1 n.2 (emphasis from Campbell). However, the Iowa

Court of Appeals specifically continued, "[i]n this case, both the stop of the car for the
registration violation and the officer's instruction to Campbell to place her purse back in the car,
preceded the time when probable cause to search the car arose due to the discovery of the

marijuana in the center console during the inventory search." Id. (emphasis from original).
Thus, the prosecutor's argument in Campbell misread and misapplied Eubanks. Id.
As such, a full reading of Campbell's analysis demonstrates it did far more than simply
acknowledge probable cause as a part of the analysis as the State contends.

It specifically

explained how the very argument the State is offering in Ms. Maloney' s case represents an
erroneous application of Eubanks and how Eubanks actually supports the argument Ms. Maloney
is making. Id.
Since even the lone case cited by the State actually supports Ms. Maloney's argument,
this Court should join its sister jurisdictions in formally recognizing the common-sense analysis
articulated in Holt - that, when a purse is not in the car when probable cause arises to search the
car, the purse cannot be said to be an area inside the car where the suspected contraband might

cause develops almost immediately, and as such, the subsequent removal of the container from
the car will not prevent a search of the container.
11

be found. As a result of that common-sense reasoning, consistent with the applicable Fourth
Amendment precedent, Ms. Maloney' s purse could not be searched under the automobile
exception in those circumstances because it simply was not part of the automobile when the
ability to search the automobile arose.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Maloney respectfully requests this Court vacate her conviction, reverse the order
denying her motion to suppress, and remand this case for whatever additional proceedings might
be needed.
DATED this 1st day of July, 2020.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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